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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Motivation
Explosive hazards are a constant threat across the world. They do not discriminate,

claiming the life of anyone unfortunate enough to be too close when they activate. Explosive hazards can be placed for numerous reasons, both malicious and benign. The
problem arises whenthrough intent or carelessnessthese devices are not properly disposed
of or stored. Due to the nature of explosive hazards, they can remain active for a long
time after being placed. In some cases, these devices are concealed so that they might
be triggered before they are seen. The U.S. Army is actively investing in research to find
methods for safely detecting these devices. Explosive hazard detection is not an easy task.
The first problem is that the devices vary in size and shape, and there are no standards for
what materials will be used to house the explosives. The second–and potentially bigger–
problem is that the individuals placing these devices might have gone to great length to
conceal them. Explosive hazards can be hidden in mundane objects or foliage so that they
are not visible to the naked eye. This requires that any method of detection be able to see
through common ways of concealing an explosive hazard and remain far enough away to
not trigger the device. Radar is a large focus of research for explosive hazard detection. Its
ability to penetrate opaque objects make it particularly useful for this task. If successful,
1

this would allow for the detection and removal of explosive hazards with much less risk to
the individuals disposing of them.

1.2

Overview of the problem
This thesis work was completed for a research project funded by the U.S. Army RDE-

COM CERDEC NVESD. The goal was to develop a forward radar vehicle capable of
detecting, in real time, concealed explosive devices placed along the side of the road. The
vehicle was fit with a high-resolution dual-band vertical linear array radar capable of creating a 3D voxel space image. The system used forward motion to create a near field
3D synthetic aperture radar image. I have developed a signal processing algorithm for
detecting a side attack explosive ballistic (SAEB). First, I fused a matched filter and a sizecontrast filter to create an anomaly detector for objects in the image. The results were fed
through clustering and heuristics to filter out non-target objects. Finally, a convolutional
neural network was applied in place of the clustering and heuristics to classify SAEBs. The
results for both methods were compared and the strengths and weaknesses are discussed.

1.3

Contributions
In this research, a multi-stage algorithm has been created for detecting SAEBs within

3D synthetic aperture radar imagery. The first stage is the fusion of matched filtering
and size-contrast filtering. This is performed on a 2D image of the radar data. The fusion
method is the product of the two filters results. This produced an image of all objects within
the data that were both anomalous and had a similar energy signature as a SAEB. Items
such as thick branches, larger rocks, and other similar solid objects could also produce an
2

anomalous response. Mean shift clustering is used to determine how many distinct objects
were detected by the fused filter results. A size heuristic is used to reject objects that are
too large or too small to be a SAEB. The heuristic was effective at removing things such
as concrete walls, metal signs, or noise in the data that passed the fusion filtering. The
combination of the filtering, fusion, clustering, and heuristics produced better results than
any sub-combination of the techniques. The matched filter and size-contrast fusion were
adapted to run on the raw 3D radar data, and a clustering of the 3D data was used to find
distinct objects. Three 2D images of each detection were created by collapsing the 3D data
along each of the axis. A shallow and a deep convolutional neural network was created to
replace the heuristic classifier. Both the deep and shallow CNNs performed approximately
the same, with the deep CNN doing slightly better in most tests.

3

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND

2.1

Digital Signal Processing
Digital signal processing (DSP) has developed as an incredibly useful tool for handling

signals in a noisy environment. This can be the generation of signals, modifying existing
signals, or extracting meaningful information within a given signal. The term, digital, is
used to denote the digitization of the sampled signal to allow for processing by generaluse computers or specialized processing devices. The field of DSP is the marriage of
electrical engineering, statistics, and applied mathematics. A sensor is sampled at evenly
spaced intervals generating a discrete time-series of amplitudes. This discrete signal data
is processed via the desired computations, and an output is produced. In DSP, a signal is
defined as any sensory data that can be observed and converted into a digital representation
of the original [42]. The most common types of signals used are audio, image, radar,
and biomedical (ECG, X-ray, EEG, etc). With respect to these signals, DSP can perform
operations such as enhancement, recognition, equalization, coding, and communication
[42]. The following sections will explore a few of these techniques.

4

2.1.1

Matched Filtering

A common task in signal processing is to detect a specific signal obfuscated in noise,
where noise is defined as everything other than the desired signal. A matched filter is the
optimal linear filter for maximizing the signal to noise ratio (SNR) for a known signal in
the presence of additive stochastic noise. An unknown signal, x(t), is defined as, x(t) =
s(t) + η(t), where s(t) is the known signal and η(t) is the noise. The filter used is simply a
time-reversal of the desired signal x(t). The filter response, h(τ ) = κs(∆−τ ), will also be
a time reversal of the desired signal, but scaled by an amount κ and delayed by ∆ samples
[64]. The equation for a matched filter response at time m is,

h(m) =

M
X

x(i + m)s(i)

(2.1)

i=1

These filtering methods have been expanded to 2-dimensional data [46]. This allows for
direct application to data such as synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery or digital photos.
The equation for a 2-dimensional matched filter is,

h(m, n) =

M X
N
X

x(i + m, j + n)s(i, j)

(2.2)

i=1 j=1

where M and N are the dimensions of the filter.

2.1.2

Size Contrast Filter

A method for anomaly detection is a size-contrast filter. By assuming the size of the
objects that need to be detected, we can create a filter for detecting objects of roughly
that size that are sufficiently different from their surroundings. Figure 2.1 gives a visual
representation of how the filter is structured. An inner halo is specified to be as large as
5

the objects being detected. There is a guard band that separates the two halos. Then the
outer halo encompasses the area around the inner halo. At each point of the input data,
the divergence in the gaussian distribution of the data between the inner and outer halo is
calculated. To calculate this divergence the Bhattacharyya distance formula is used.
 2

2
σI + σO
(µI − µO )2 1
+ ln p 2 2
dB (I, O) =
2
4(σI2 + σO
) 2
2 σI σO

(2.3)

The larger the divergence between the two distributions, the more anomalous the area
within the inner halo. The sizes of the inner and outer halo can be changed as needed for
the problem. A SCF can easily be adapted to 3-dimensional data. It is also not required
that they are square, rectangular, or even the same shape.

Outer halo
Outer halo
divergence(OD,ID) = ?

Guard band

Inner halo

Guard band

Inner halo

Outer distro
(OD)

Inner distro
(ID)

Figure 2.1: Illustration of the size contrast filter (SCF).

2.2

Object Detection and Classification
Object detection falls within a subcategory of deep learning called computer vision.

These algorithms attempt to locate an object within data, commonly an image, and respond
in a pre-defined way [6]. There are a myriad ways that these methods can be utilized,
6

and the current research is constantly expanding the list of potential uses. The following
sections will cover the object detection methods used in this research.

2.2.1

Mean-Shift Clustering

Mean-shift clustering takes advantage of kernel density estimation (KDE) to extrapolate the number of clusters within a dataset, and uses mean shift to assign each data-point to
one of the clusters [3]. A KDE is a non-parametric method for representing the probability
density function of data. The equation is defined as follows.

N
2
x − xn
1 X
K
x<D
p(x) =
N n=1
σ

(2.4)

Where, K is the kernel used, and K = e−t/2 is the gaussian kernel. The  represents the
bandwidth parameter, which determines how large an area is used to determine density.
The smaller the bandwidth value the more local maximum, or modes, will appear in the
estimated probability density function. This will result in more clusters being defined.
Once the probability density function is defined, an iterative approach can be used to find
each of the modes, which represent the centers of each of the clusters.
f (x) =

N
X

n 2
|| )
K 0 (|| x−x
σ

PN
n=1

n0 =1

K 0 (||

x−xn0 2 xn
|| )
σ

(2.5)

Eq. 2.4 iterates through each data point and assigns it to the nearest mode using mean shift
convergence. Data points that exist directly on local minimum or at a saddle point will not
converge, but this is rare, and can be detected by looking for single points clusters.
The advantages of mean shift clustering are: (1) No assumptions are made regarding the
number or shape of clusters. (2) The entire algorithm is tuned by a single parameter, the
bandwidth. (3) The algorithm is not sensitive to outliers in the data.
7

2.2.2

Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)

CNNs are a specialized type of neural network that replaces general matrix multiplication with convolution in at least one of its layers [24]. The goal of CNNs is to imitate the
way in which an animal visual cortex handles complex images [18]. As a result, CNNs are
commonly used in the field of computer vision. Figure 2.2 shows a standard structure for a
CNN. The input data will be passed to feature extraction, which is comprised of successive
layers of convolution, activation, and pooling. The number and size of each layer in the
feature extraction section of the CNN is tailored to the complexity of the images being
classified. The final few layers of the CNN are the classification layers. This is where a
fully connected layer accepts the feature extraction output and it activates one of the output neurons. These output neurons each represent one of the possible classifications. In
the example from Figure 2.2 there are ten output neurons, each representing a possible
handwritten digit. The following sections will go into more detail regarding the individual
layers of a CNN.

Figure 2.2: Basic structure of a convolutional neural network designed to classifiy
handwritten numbers [66].
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2.2.2.1

Convolutional Layer

There are two sets of parameters that affect the behavior and output of the convolutional
layer. The first is the height and width of the convolutional window, normally referred to as
the receptive field. This will slide across the input performing a convolution operation on
everything inside the receptive field. The size of the receptive field will determine the size
of the output, with larger fields producing smaller feature maps due to more of the input
being covered by the window at once. The second parameter that can affect the output of
the convolutional layer is how edge cases are handled. When the center of the receptive
field approaches the ends of the input data there needs to be a way to handle the cells
of the receptive field that are outside of the data. Figure 2.3 shows a simple example of
performing the convolution on the corner cell of a 2D data set causing part of the receptive
field to be out of bounds.

This problem can be solved by several simple methods, such

as extending the edge values out as needed or padding the input data with zeros. The ideal
solution depends on the type of data being processed and the desired results.

2.2.2.2

Pooling Layer

The primary function of the pooling layer is to reduce the dimensionality of the data.
This is can be seen in Figure 2.2. The size of the feature maps shrink after each pooling
(subsampling) layer. The degree of dimension reduction can be tuned based on the needs
of the system. Another task that the pooling layer can perform is to perform a maximum
or average operation on the data during subsampling. This can be done for the purpose of
smoothing, or to bring forth the most prominent values within the data.
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Figure 2.3: Example of the receptive field in the convolutional layer being partially out of
the bounds of the input data.

2.2.2.3

Activation Function

The activation function is connected to the output of the convolutional layer. It allows
for nonlinear neuron activation. A common example is the rectified linear unit (ReLU).
This is defined as
A(x) = max(0, x)
. This causes all values less that zero to produce no activation. This can notably increase
computational speeds by reducing the number of active neurons to only ones with a high
response. There are other possible activation functions, such as sigmoid, tahn, and maxout.
There are also veriations on the ReLU function to help with problematic edgecases [43].
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2.2.2.4

Fully Connected Layer

After the feature extraction is complete, the feature maps are passed to the fully connected layer. In this layer each neuron is connected to all of the activations from the previous layer. This is where the ”learning” is performed. Each output neuron represents one of
the possible classifications, and just like a multi-layer preceptron the fully connected layer
learns weights to best classify the input data.

2.2.2.5

Challenges

CNNs produce good results in a lot of visual tasks. Time series data, and topological
data are just two examples of areas where CNNs are successful. CNNs still have a lot of
challenges. A major example is the black box nature of CNNs. Most of discrimination
occurs within the hidden layers, and it is difficult to determine what features have been
learned. Another example is the problem of consistently classifying the same object with
different positioning or orientation. Even with the advent of data augmentation, which has
shown some improvement in this area, this is still a notable problem. lastly, a large data set
of labeled data is needed for adequate training.

2.3

Forward-Looking 3D Radar
Forward looking radar is being used in several research fields such as automated ground-

based vehicle systems, weather tracking, and explosive hazard detection [58] [69] [57].
Forward-looking radar is now being used to generate 3D models of the environment, allowing for imaging of an area without physically being in or above it [58] [5]. This provides
a huge advantage by allowing for stand-off scanning for explosives in an area.
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The 3D radar is comprised of a dual-band vertical linear array that operates in Ku and Ka
bands. This scans an area in front of the array. With forward motion, by attaching to a
moving vehicle, the system can create a high-resolution near field 3D synthetic aperture
radar image [58].
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CHAPTER III
VOXEL-SPACE RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSING FOR SIDE ATTACK EXPLOSIVE
BALLISTIC DETECTION

3.1

Abstract
Explosive hazards in current and former conflict zones are a serious threat to both

civilians and soldiers alike. Significant effort has been dedicated to identifying sensors,
algorithms and fusion strategies to detect such threats. However, a challenging aspect of
the field is that we are not necessarily at war with the threats (objects). Instead, we are
at conflict with people who are constantly evolving their strategies of attack along with
their preferred threat. One such method of threat delivery is side attack explosive ballistics
(SAEB). In this article, I explore different 3D voxel-space radar signal processing methods
for SAEB detection on a U.S. Army provided vehicle-mounted platform. In particular, I
explore the fusion of a matched filter (MF) and size contrast filter (SCF). Clustering is
applied to the fused result and heuristics are used to reduce the systems false alarm rate.
Performance is assessed in the context of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
on data from a U.S. Army test site containing multiple target and clutter types, levels of
concealment and times of day.
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3.2

Introduction
Explosive hazards are deadly weapons that are crafted to cause chaos and destruction.

These devices threaten civilian and military personnel in both current and former conflict
zones. Between November of 2005 and December of 2011, a total of 1, 526 explosive hazard incidents killed 191 U.S. soldiers and injured 861 [67]. According to the International
Campaign to ban Landmines[36], there are approximately 4,000 people killed or injured
each year due to landmines or other unexploded ordinances (UXOs). Furthermore, according to the Washington Post, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were responsible for 63%
of all U.S. soldiers killed in action in Iraq from 2003-2007[55]. As a result, the U.S. Army
is avidly pursuing solutions to safely detect and remove such hazards. However, this is
not a trivial task due to the variability that explosive hazard detection (EHD) has to account for. Hazards can (and do) vary in shape, size and material composition, and they are
often concealed. The people or organizations that create such devices are also constantly
evolving their strategies. Much effort has been dedicated towards the identification of a
multi-sensor system based on technologies like infrared [13, 54, 1], radar [11, 21, 28] and
acoustic [12, 16], to name a few.
Herein, I focus on an efficient prescreener for high-resolution 3D voxel space radar.
More specifically, I explore the use of a matched filter (MF) and a size contrast filter (SCF)
to find target like and anomalous objects respectively. The results from the output of the
MF and SCF are fused together to find regions of interest that are then subjected to domain
heuristics. The performance of our prescreener is evaluated using receiver operating char-
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acteristic (ROC) curve analysis, which measures the number of positive detections (PDs)
with respect to the number of false alarms (FAs). Figure (3.1) illustrates our approach.

PD
FAR
Full 3D voxel
Radar data

Downsample:
energy threshold
and pooling

Scoring

Target
detection:
matched filter

Anomaly
detection:
Size contrast filter

Aggregation:
Fusion of MF
and SCF

f(
2D view

3D filter

,

Clustering:
CCs or MS

Region Analysis:
Is the region too
small or two large?

)=

Inner & outer halos

Figure 3.1: Illustration of the proposed voxel space radar signal processing system
(prescreener). A full resolution voxel space is downsampled and pooled (Section 3.4.1), a
matched filter is run to detect targets (Section 3.4.2), size contrast filtering is used to find
anomalies (Section 3.4.3), and their results are aggregated (Section 3.4.4). Next, the result
is thresholded and clustering is used to find regions of interest (Section 3.4.5). Last,
region properties are extracted and heuristics are used to eliminate false alarms (Section
3.4.6). For testing, receiver operating characteristic curves are extracted to evaluate the
performance of the system and its parts.

The organization of the article is as follows. Section 3.3 gives a brief technical description of the voxel space radar system, Section 3.4 is a detailed description of the prescreener,
Section 3.5 is experiments and results. Last, Section 3.6 is conclusion and plans for future
work.
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3.3

Radar Sensor and Platform
In this article, I consider a high-resolution 3D voxel space radar sensor (operating in

Ku or Ka band) mounted on a vehicle platform developed by the US Army RDECOM
CERDEC NVESD and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory [58]. This system incorporates a vehicle-borne dual-band vertical linear array, which is linearly scanned via
vehicle forward motion to create a high-resolution near field 3D synthetic aperture radar
(SAR) image. Additional details on this system and sensor can be found at [58]. The focus
of this paper is not the radar system. Instead, I am focused on algorithms for processing
the radar data. For completeness sake, I will quickly summarize a few important and relevant system details. First, the resolution of the voxel space is 1cm. Herein, “voxel space
chunks” of size 1003 × 186 × 1024 (approximately 32.91 × 6.1 × 33.6 feet) are produced–
where the first index is the direction of the vehicle moving down the road, the second index
is vertical height and the last index is the standoff distance of objects along the side of the
vehicle. The rate of advance of the system is 4 to 6 mph, the transmitted power is 10
dBm, the sweep bandwidth is 5 GHz and the frequency sweep/chirp time is 10µsec. For
the Ku-band array, the frequency bands are 11 − 16 GHz and 15 − 20 GHz, the length is
2.4m, the antenna type/polarization is a 15 dBi pyramidal horn/VV pol, the antenna count
is 32 transmit, 48 receive and the effective vertical samples is 186. For the Ka-band array,
the frequency bands are 25 − 30 GHz, the length is 1.5m, the antenna type/polarization
is a 15 dBi pyramidal horn/VV pol, the antenna count is 24 transmit, 32 receive and the
effective vertical samples is 180. Since the radar system is mounted on a moving vehicle,
motion estimation and motion compensation is performed. Again, full details can be found
16

in [58]. Figures (3.2) and (3.3) are illustrations of recorded voxel chunks (the latter being
simpler to solve). Note, since the voxel space is a solid it cannot be directly rendered (we
would not see any of the content hidden by the outer hull of the voxel space). For a visual
representation of the voxel space, I project the cube to the three principle axes and the max
value for each location is recorded. These two figures (voxel chunks) are used throughout
the article to show the results of different stages in data processing.
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Figure 3.2: Projection of a voxel chunk onto its three principle axes–XY, YZ and XZ.
Target is highlighted in the XY image.

3.4 Prescreener
3.4.1 Downsampling and Thresholding
As already stated, the system has a voxel sampling rate of 1cm. As a result, the
1003 × 186 × 1024 voxel chunk size results in 191, 035, 392 voxels. However, the 1cm
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Figure 3.3: Projection of a voxel chunk onto its three principle axes–XY, YZ and XZ.
Target is highlighted in the XY image.

sampling rate could be overkill and many voxels below some minimum acceptable energy
level can be removed. Herein, I downsample the 1cm voxel space to a larger odd sized sampling rate, e.g., 3cm, 5cm, etc. Without loss of generality, I selected an odd versus even
size for simplicity and speed of indexing, however the procedure could easily be extended
for an even or fractional amount. For each newly sampled location, I take the average over
the sample neighborhood. Other aggregations like the minimum (pessimistic operator) or
maximum (optimistic operator) or any more robust linear combination of order statistics
(LCOS) could be performed. I selected the average because I did not anticipate that a resolution of 1cm was needed and wanted to do some data smoothing to reduce the impact of
noise/outliers. However, this is obviously a parameter that can be optimized, studied and
its overall sensitivity analyzed. Next, I threshold energies below some system determined
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minimum energy value (Figure (3.4)). Whereas the full voxel chunk had 191, 035, 392
voxels, the new downsampled and thresholded space is typically a fraction of the original
size (e.g., 10% to 30%). Note, whereas downsampling impacts the entire voxel space, in
thresholding only the surviving indices are stored. These indices are then used for processing but the full downsampled data is used in those operations–meaning each location
processed has access to all of the original (be it downsampled) data. No data is “thrown
away”.

Figure 3.4: Illustration of thresholding the voxel space based on a minimum energy
amount.

3.4.2

Matched Filter

The idea behind this article is to exploit two fronts. First, can we take prior knowledge–
known signals from a data collection or possibly a signal generated via simulation–and use
it to help find things that look like what we expect? Second, can we find things that are very
different from their local surroundings? In this subsection, I consider the task of finding
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things that look like a known signal (target). Herein, I restrict my analysis to a simple, but
well-grounded technique, the matched filter (MF). Figure (3.5) is an example filter.

Figure 3.5: Illustration of a filter for matched filtering. The left picture is the projection of
the voxel cube to the XY axis via the maximum operator. The right picture is a voxel
space rendering of the full cube–where black lines show the cubes and alpha transparency
is used where the transparency amount is dictated by the energy at each voxel.

The MF starts by determining the filter M , where M is of original size (before downsampling) 27 × 17 × 11cm herein. Note, I picked M in this preliminary work from training
data. The voxel data corresponded to a target out in the open, versus a concealed and more
difficult to detect target that would contain more “background” signal data as well (e.g.,
bush). Furthermore, the target was selected based on visual analysis in the radar data, not
its known physical size. Herein, M is normalized such that its energy sums to one. Once
the MF is obtained, convolution is used to process the data, i.e., a downsampled voxel
chunk. As stated above, only voxels above the threshold value are processed–leading to
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drastically fewer calculations. Figure (3.6) is the application of the MF to the voxel chunk
in Figure (3.2).
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Figure 3.6: Application of the matched filter to the voxel chunk in Figure (3.2). The target
is highlighted in red.

The MF is not perfect. It is well-known that when a signal is convolved with itself the
max value is at the location where the signals are equal–i.e., no time (spatial for 2D) shift.
However, if we convolve a signal with a scaled version of itself then we can still identify the
zero shift location but its value is smaller than if we convolved it with a non-scaled version
of the filter. The point is, the amplitude of the result is proportional to the energy of our
underlying filter and data being processed. As such, this impacts our ability to detect in
lower energy regions and also with respect to non-target objects that reflect relatively large
amounts of energy in our bands. This can be observed in Figure (3.6). Whereas I get a
good response for our target (highlighted in red), I also get high returns in areas that are
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not target (high energy regions). In this initial work I have not attempted to locally scale
convolution, the MF or underlying data being convolved. In part, this is due to the fact
that I combine the MF result with an anomaly detector (the SCF). However, in future work
I will investigate locally adaptive techniques to reduce the sensitivity of the MF to the
underlying energy–helping us better detect faint target signatures and not have as large of
responses in high non-target regions. Furthermore, in future work I will explore the use of
multiple MFs and the intelligent fusion or selection of these MFs for the robust detection
of a range of targets with different emplacements (angles, sizes, shapes, concealment.). I
also intend to investigate more advanced 2D and 3D energy, phase and shape features and
classifiers versus the MF.

3.4.3

Size Contrast Filter

In the previous section I considered the direct detection of targets via a MF. In this
section, I use a method to search for anomalies (things that look different from their local surroundings). The only assumption here is that we know an approximate size and
approximate shape for our targets. An advantage of looking for anomalies is that if we
do not know the target signature but the target is sparsely represented in the data we can
still detect it. The downfall is that we detect anything anomalous at that size/shape, not
just targets. Herein, I use a size contrast filter (SCF) to detect locally anomalous objects.
Figure (3.7) illustrates the SCF.

22

Outer halo
Outer halo
divergence(OD,ID) = ?

Guard band

Inner halo

Guard band

Inner halo

Outer distro
(OD)

Inner distro
(ID)

Figure 3.7: Illustration of the size contrast filter (SCF). In general, there is an outer
region, guard band, and the outer halo. The left is a typical 2D SCF, which requires the
specification of width and height for the inner, gaurd and outer regions. The middle
picture is the 3D SCF, which simply has one more dimension than the 2D filter. Note, the
SCF does not need to be a cube, it can be a rectangle of any arbitrary shape/size. Last, the
right figure shows a plot of the divergence of values (energies herein) between the outer
halo (blue) and inner halo (red). The idea is that the further the blue and red distributions
are, the more anomalous that location is.

The SCF is applied (convolved) to the voxel space. Like the MF, I only calculate the
SCF at locations that pass our initial energy threshold test (Figure (3.8)). Again, this is
done for computational savings.
In order to calculate a value at each location (voxel) for the SCF, we must have a way to
measure divergence between two distributions (the energies in the inner and outer halos).
Let I be the set of energies in the inner halo and O be the energies in the outer halo.
Herein, we use the Bhattacharyya distance between I and O, dB (I, O). The assumption
made by this divergence measure is that the data can be sufficiently characterized by a
normal distribution,
(µI − µO )2 1
+ ln
dB (I, O) =
2
4(σI2 + σO
) 2
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Figure 3.8: Illustration of the convolving of a SCF (blue, green and red object) with our
data (orange). This convolution is shown in 2D for visual simplicity. Note, the locations
in black are locations that pass our energy threshold test. All other values get assigned a
value of zero for the SCF.

2
)) are the mean and variances of the inner (and outer) windows
where (µI , σI2 ) (and (µO , σO

respectively. Figure (3.9) illustrates the general trend of “poor” to “good” criteria for divergence relative to detecting anomalies with the SCF. Figure (3.10) is an example of the
output of the SCF with underlying Bhattacharyya distance with respect to the voxel chunk
in Figure (3.2).
Note, the size of the inner halo was set to the size of the voxel cube that I extracted and
used for the MF. The size of the outer halo was set to three times this size, allowing us to
balance dissimilarity with respect to some local fractional amount of the inner halo size.
In future work I will look to either locally adjust the filter size and/or try to determine the
most optimal halo sizes. These values were just selected for this initial preliminary work.
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Figure 3.9: Illustration of different hypothetical inner and outer halo distributions relative
to the detection of anomalies with respect to the Bhattacharyya measure.
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Figure 3.10: Application of the SCF to the voxel chunk in Figure (3.2). The target is
highlighted in red.
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3.4.4

Aggregation (of MF and SCF)

The last two subsections outlined procedures for detection with respect to the MF and
SCF. In this subsection I look at combining these two concepts. In the results section I
compare the MF, SCF and combination of the two. The motivation for combining these
filters is so we are more confident in locations that are both anomalous and target like. In
this preliminary work, I take a t-norm (intersection like), specifically the product (multiplication) operator. In general, aggregation often ranges from a pessimistic operator (e.g., the
minimum) to more robust (e.g., average) to optimistic operator (e.g., maximum). However,
there are a wealth of operators (functions) in that “spectrum”. In future work, when I generate more filters beyond the MF and SCF, or multiple MFs and SCFs, I will explore more
sophisticated aggregation, e.g., the Choquet integral. Figure (3.11) shows the product of
the MF and SCF for the voxel chunk in Figure (3.2).
The target in Figure (3.2) is not the strongest, relative to the energies of the rest of
that voxel chunk. Figures (3.12) and (3.13) are another voxel chunk where the target is
still faint but a bit more unique (easier to detect). These figures are provided simply for
additional visualization purposes to aid the reader in reading the article.

3.4.5

Clustering

After the MF and SCF results are combined, a final threshold is applied to the data.
This value is selected herein via receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve analysis–
tradeoff analysis of the systems positive detection rate (PDR) and false alarm rate (FAR).
The result of this threshold is a set of voxel in which I identify regions of interest (ROIs) by
26
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Figure 3.11: Illustration of the product of the MF and SCF for the voxel chunk in Figure
(3.2). The left column is the combined filter output. The right column is the raw data.
Note, the result is clearer (fewer possible target locations and the target “confidence”,
product operator result, is larger than most other areas) than Figure (3.10) and Figure
(3.6).
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Figure 3.12: (left column) SCF and (right column) MF results for the voxel chunk showen
in Figure (3.3). The target is indicated by a red circle.
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Figure 3.13: Illustration of the combined filter result for the voxel chunk shown in Figure
(3.3). The left column is the SCF, the right column is the MF and the center column is the
combined (product operator) result.

clustering this point set. Herein, I considered two methods, mean shift clustering, a mode
seeking algorithm, and connected components. Mean shift clustering will help us find the
modes in the data and be more robust to segmenting ROIs that are not directly connected
(based on specification of the kernel function and windowing function size). I also explore
the performance of connected components, as it simply finds all connected blobs/ROIs
with respect to specification of a neighborhood criteria, e.g., 4 point connectivity, 8 point
connectivity, etc. Figure (3.14) is a simple illustration of these two different methods.
Figure (3.15) illustrates ROIs identified for the fused MF and SCF result shown in Figure
(3.11).

3.4.6

Domain Heuristics

Last, it is possible that phenomena like high energy regions can trick our MF and
possibly still get by the SCF (and therefore their fused result). As a sort of sanity check,
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Figure 3.14: Illustration of the result of mean shift clustering (top) and connected
components (bottom). While locations are voxels that survive the threshold test post
aggregation (the points used in clustering) and black are voxels that did not past the test.
The mean shift algorithm identified two clusters (centers shown in red and green). The
connected components identified four regions.
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Figure 3.15: ROIs (white circles) extracted from the fusion of the MF and SCF for Figure
(3.11).
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we extract the number of voxels and the object’s shape and engage in heuristics to reject
ROIs that are not believed to be targets. The simplest such test is to remove ROIs with
too few of voxels, e.g., reflections off rocks, and too many voxels, e.g., reflections from
certain walls/objects. Thus, our system has two parameters, the minimum and maximum
size that we will allow for ROIs to be considered as a target. These parameters were
empirically determined herein and will be optimized in the future–and expanded to include
more general shape and other heuristics to build in domain knowledge.

3.5

Preliminary Experiments and Results
In this section, preliminary experiments and results are reported using ROC curve anal-

ysis on blind data from a U.S. Army test site. These results are preliminary because I am
in the early stages of testing the radar system and as a result I have not collected large
amounts of data yet. Furthermore, data collection at this level is quite an endeavor, as it
requires a great deal of planning, precision, time and as a result, money. I was provided
a few runs to learn from and do initial algorithm development. The results shown below
are for multiple types of targets with varying levels of concealment, relative to different
natural and man made clutter. Two lanes, Lane 1 and Lane 2, are used and each lane had
two different emplacements. In total, I had four runs to score. There were a total of XXX
targets with respect to an area of XXX.
For the aggregation of the MF and SCF outputs, the product operator (a t-norm) is
used. Post-aggregation, three methods were used to generate an alarm confidence from a
cluster. First, I took the maximum aggregated result in the cluster. Second, I considered the
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product of the maximum value with the maximum energy of that cluster. Last, I explored
the average aggregation result of the cluster. In addition, I compared my results to a simple
energy prescreener, which consists of applying a threshold, clustering and then taking the
maximum energy in each cluster. Last, I considered the individual performance of just the
SCF and the MF. Figures (3.16), (3.17) and (3.18) are the blind data ROC curves.
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Figure 3.16: Comparison of different filters, their combinations and alarm confidence
generation technique. X-axis is FAs per meter squared, y-axis is PDR.

Figures (3.16), (3.17) and (3.18) tell the following story. First, the SCF outperforms the
MF and the fusion of the SCF and the MF does the best overall. Furthermore, the maximum
(optimistic aggregation) is far superior to considering the average response in a cluster.
Next, every method does better than a simple energy prescreener. What is interesting is in
Lane 1, the more difficult lane, the SCF and fusion system are very similar, outperforming
each other at different FARs. However, in the simpler lane, Lane 2, the fusion is always a
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Figure 3.17: Performance of SCF versus fusion of MF and SCF. Results are relative to
two lanes with two emplacements each. X-axis is FAs per meter squared, y-axis is PDR.
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Figure 3.18: Performance of SCF versus fusion of MF and SCF on both lanes with both
emplacements. X-axis is FAs per meter squared, y-axis is PDR.

lot better. Overall, for an initial prescreener, the results are very encouraging on blind data.
At that, I compared the system findings and our fusion result was close to an expert at low
FARs and the system exceeded what the human found overall in terms of PDR.

3.6

Conclusion
Herein, I put forth a relatively efficient 3D voxel space radar prescreener algorithm

based on fusing a direct detection algorithm, the matched filter, and an anomaly algorithm,
the size contrast filter. Different operators from downsampling to clustering and domain
heuristics were used to realize a system for SAEB detection. Our results are very encouraging. In many cases this initial algorithm matched and eventually beat an expert.
Furthermore, our algorithm does better than a simple energy prescreener and the fused
result is the best overall.
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Whereas initial results are promising, there is much room for improvement. For example, the matched filter is a simple signal processing technique. In future work I will
replace it with three dimensional features and advanced machine learning algorithms. Furthermore, I only had two inputs to fuse and a simple t-norm was selected. In the future, I
will generate more direct detect and anomaly inputs, and possibly other sensor data, and
look to a method like the Choquet integral to fuse at different levels, e.g., signal, feature
and/or decision. Last, I have not yet truly exploited any intelligent domain heuristics. In
the future I will look to learn and reason about our evidence for false alarm reduction.
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CHAPTER IV
CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORK BASED SIDE ATTACK EXPLOSIVE
HAZARD DETECTION IN THREE DIMENSIONAL VOXEL RADAR

4.1

Abstract
The identification followed by avoidance or removal of explosive hazards in past and/or

present conflict zones is a serious threat for both civilian and military personnel. This is
a challenging task as variability exists with respect to the objects, their environment and
emplacement context, to name a few factors. A goal is the development of automatic or
human-in-the-loop sensor technologies that leverage signal processing, data fusion and machine learning. Herein, I explore the detection of side attack explosive hazards (SAEHs)
in three dimensional voxel space radar via different shallow and deep convolutional neural
network (CNN) architectures. Dimensionality reduction is performed by using multiple
projected images versus the raw three dimensional voxel data, which leads to noteworthy
savings in input size and associated network hyperparameters. Last, I explore the accuracy and interpretation of solutions learned via random versus intelligent network weight
initialization. Experiments are provided on a U.S. Army data set collected over different
times, weather conditions, target types and concealments. Preliminary results indicate that
deep learning can perform as good as, if not better, than a skilled domain expert, even in
light of limited training data with a class imbalance.
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4.2

Introduction
Explosive hazard devices continue to be a threat to both military personnel and civil-

ians. As a result, explosive hazard detection (EHD) is being investigated via a number of
different technologies, e.g., ground penetrating radar (GPR) [60, 29, 27], electromagnetic
induction (EMI) [33], infrared (IR) imaging [61, 60, 29], multi-spectral imaging [34, 9], xray diffraction and neutron bombardment [26, 35], nuclear quadrupole resonance [22, 15],
synthetic aperture acoustics (SAA) [51], voxel space radar (VSR) [40], and biosensors
(dogs, rats, etc.) [25, 45], to name a few. The problem is, a single sensor is not capable of
solving all EHD tasks. EHD requires physics, electronics engineering, low-level signal and
image processing, high-level machine learning and ultimately, fusion of signals, features
and decisions within and across sensors. EHD is difficult in part because of the adversarial environment. In general, EH devices vary in size, shape, construction materials, and
method of activation. The devices are also delivered in a number of ways, e.g., buried,
hidden within dense foliage, or covered by roadside debris. Variables such as these make
the reliable detection of EHs a formidable task.
Whereas a number of sensors and platforms have been explored to date, herein I focus
on ground vehicle based VSR for SAEH detection. In particular, radar is attractive due to
its ability to penetrate and image concealed objects. This is a fascinating system because it
is a balance of power (sensing capability) relative to limited operating scope. Ultimately,
this technology has great potential to make a positive impact on EHD.
Prior VSR SAEH work focused on the development of prescreener algorithms to detect
EHDs within 2D and 3D data. When visible, EHDs tend to have a higher energy signature
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relative to its surroundings, so size-contrast filters (SCF) have been used to isolate anomalous energy signatures.[41] Though this is able to locate many test cases, it was easily
tricked by common objects such as rocks, thick branches, and roadside debris of sufficient density and shape that reflect significant energy towards the sensor. The next method
explored was matched filtering (MF) using an ideal target signature as a filter.[41] This
approach is more successful in detecting EHDs hidden within foliage or roadside debris
than just an SCF. The MF alone would return abnormally high values if the pixel-wise energy of the filter being used represented a subset of the energy for the area being evaluated.
Therefore, any large, high-energy objects present in the data would trigger the MF. The
best prescreener results were previously achieved through a weighted fusion of SCF and
MF results.[41] This allows for the isolation of objects that are both anomalous in energy
values and shaped similar to an EHD. In addition to the SCF-MF weighted fusion, several
methods have been utilized to increase the success chance of the prescreener. Some of
these methods have been data normalization, ignoring energy clusters outside of possible
size of an EHD, and dynamic fusion weights based on estimated occlusion[14].
Herein, I make the following specific contributions. First, I study the performance of
shallow and deep(er) convolutional neural network (CNN) architectures for VSR SAEH
detection. Second, I explore dimensionality reduction of the input voxel space–and therefore subsequently the size of network hyperparameters–via projections onto orthogonal
axes. Third, I explore the impact and interpretation of random versus intelligent weight
(aka the filters) initialization. Last, these approaches are compared to the performance of
a human-in-the-loop (HITL) ground truth to determine overall effectiveness.
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Figure 4.1: High-level illustration of the major steps performed in this article. First, the
raw data is subjected to a prescreener for alarm identification. Next, local voxel chunks
are extracted at each alarm, they are downsampled and converted into a smaller projected
data cube. The resultant data is then subjected to training and testing using deep learning.
Section 4.3 discusses the raw data and Section 4.4 delves into the remaining blocks.

The remainder of this article is organized as such. In Section 4.3 I summarize the
three dimensional VSR sensor and our platform. Section 4.4 discusses our (i) input dimensionality method, (ii) shallow and deep net architectures, (iii) approach to address class
imbalance and (iv) network initialization methods. Section 4.5 is focused on experiments
at a US Army test site.

4.3

Radar System
Herein, I investigate a prototype high-resolution three dimensional VSR sensor oper-

ating in Ku band mounted on a vehicle platform developed by the U.S. Army RDECOM
CERDEC NVESD and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This system incorporates a vehicle-borne dual-band vertical linear array, which is linearly scanned via vehicle
forward motion to create a high-resolution 3D synthetic aperture radar (SAR) image. The
focus of this paper is not the radar system, but algorithms that process the radar data.
For completeness sake, I quickly summarize a few important and relevant system details.
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Herein, “voxel space chunks” of size 1003×186×1024 are produced–where x is the direction of the vehicle driving on the road and y is vertical height. Since the radar is mounted
on a moving vehicle, motion estimation and compensation is performed. Figure 4.2 shows
a (left) 10m down track voxel chunk and (right) example alarm chunks. Note, since the
voxel space is a solid it cannot be directly rendered (we would not see any of the content hidden by the outer hull of the voxel space). For a visual representation of the voxel
space, I project the cube to the three principle axes and the max value for each location is
recorded.

Figure 4.2: Example radar data cube (left). The x-y projection plane is looking outward
from the vehicle, y-z is side projection and x-z is top down view. Example alarms (right).
Color code scheme was developed by Covar[14].

4.4

Deep Learning
In general, deep learning can be regarded as a generalization of the conventional sig-

nal/image processing and computer vision pipeline. In many circles the “human engineered” approach is now referred to as shallow learning because there are only a few
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“layers” in the processing pipeline. Overall, shallow and deep learning are simply a transformation of data to data, with the prior being our inputs and the later typically being decisions. However, it is often convenient to think and talk about our data at different stages
as it undergoes such transformations. Keeping with the nomenclature of the Joint Directors of Laboratories, there are steps like signal-in-signal-out (SISO), feature-in-featureout (FIFO) and decision-in-decision-out (DIDO). Most deep learning algorithms perform
SIDO, but they can be decomposed into their SIFO and FIDO counterparts.
To date, numerous shallow and deep learning approaches have been put forth. Examples include, auto encoders (AE)[32, 65, 4, 17, 23], convolutional neural networks
(CNNs)[19, 44, 7, 63, 8, 70, 62], deep belief nets (DBNs)[31, 47], recurrent neural networks (RNNs)[50, 20], generative adversarial networks [48], morphological shared weight
neural networks (MSNN)[68, 39], deep inference nets[56], to name a few. Herein, I focus on CNNs due to a number of reasons, such as their support–research and open source
libraries–and performance on benchmark data sets across applications.
There are several constituent operations to a CNN. For this discussion we will assume
the data takes the form of a three dimensional data cube. This N0 × M0 × D0 cube is comprised of two spatial dimensions and a spectral or temporal dimension (e.g., three spectral
dimensions for an RGB image). As the name suggests, CNNs use convolution to perform filtering. This filtering can serve several purposes such as enhancement, denoising,
or detection. The results of the convolution are controlled in part by tuning variables like
stride (the size of the shift of the convolving filter along a dimension) and padding (without
padding the spatial dimension is reduced each time the data passes through a convolution
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layer). (Pooling) Pooling is also known as downsampling. This layer exists to reduce the
dimensionality of the data and the two most common methods are max and average pooling. Pooling can help with issues related to noise, affine variation, etc. (Activation) This
operation allows for non-linearity in the neuronal response. There are several activation
functions that can be applied, with each functions viability being dependent on the type
of input data and the architecture of the CNN. A few examples of activation functions are
sigmoid, hyperbolic tangent (tanh), Rectified linear unit (ReLU (x) = max(0, x)), and
exponential linear units (ELUs)[10]. (Training Techniques) Different methods are employed to prevent known issues like sensitivity to parameter selection and overtraining.
The most common methods used are dropout, regularization, and batch normalization[37].
There are additional factors other than architecture–such as hardware–that can affect the
accuracy and efficiency of a CNN. For example, the use of GPU acceleration can allow for
larger input dimensions.
With respect to the architecture of a CNN there has already been a lot of exploration.
Numerous templates exist online that can be downloaded and modified to suit the developers needs. Some notable examples are GoogLeNet[62], CaffeNet[38], VGGNet[59],
and ResNet[30]. There are open source libraries like MatConvNet and TensorFlow that
can use the aforementioned architectures and also allows for robust experimentation with
derivatives and fusions of them. There are challenges fundamental to all CNNs; which
architecture to use for a given problem, how deep/wide to make it, hyperparameter tuning,
which activation function to use, etc. Also, problems such as how to maintain the explainability of the CNN (avoid a black box solution), lack of training data, and class imbalance
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need to be taken into consideration during development. Deep Learning is providing numerous new avenues of research in the field of computer vision and pattern recognition,
but there are still plenty of questions in the applied and theoretical domains that remain to
be researched in depth.

4.4.1

Prescreener; Alarm Generation

Crosskey et al. developed a prescreener to isolate regions of interest (aka alarms) in
a VSR data cube[14]. One of the major hurdles for the prescreener is reliably detecting
objects occluded by bushes or other roadside debris. Crosskey leveraged the scene context
provided by the three dimensional radar data itself to estimate the level of occlusion for
a given voxel. A synthetic array was placed in the scene and a ray tracing algorithm was
used to sum the energy along each ray from the synthetic array to a selected voxel location.
The image formed on the synthetic array is a measurement of how much occlusion there
is along each line of sight; this occlusion image is then thresholded and averaged to create
a single number between 0 and 1, the occlusion, which represents the percentage of the
energy believed should make it to the selected voxel. In order to estimate the energy of
a reflector in an unoccluded scene, Crosskey rescaled the energy by dividing,

energy
.
1−occlusion

However, this becomes singular as occlusion approaches 1, so they limited the occlusion
to a maximum value of 0.8. A traditional constant false alarm rate (CFAR) detector was
run on the data cube, and the results were fused with the occlusion rescaled energy via
confidence multiplication. The parameters of the CFAR prescreener, including the outer
and inner filter sizes were selected through an optimization procedure applied to a small
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subset of the data. In the remainder of this article, I investigate deep learning in the context
of Covar prescreener alarms, versus applied in a dense fashion on the entire data cube.

4.4.2

Input Data and Planar Projection for Dimensionality Reduction
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Figure 4.3: Example of the voxel plane projection scheme used herein for input
dimensionality reduction. Bottom center cube is the input. Images one to three are formed
via projections, f is the maximum operator herein.

It is logical to expect that, in general, the higher the input dimensionality the greater
the number of samples (volume and variety) are needed for hyperparameter estimation. An
example is the problem of training quality deep learners in hyperspectral imaging due to its
hundreds of spectral bands [52]. Voxel space radar is no exception. For a modest input data
size of 41 × 41 × 41, there are already 68, 921 input neurons. For a single convolutional
layer CNN (aka shallow net) with a mere 128 filters, there is already approximately nine
million parameters–not counting bias terms–created as supporting parameters for batch
normalization, and then subsequently neurons for classification. Herein, I explore a pretransformation step before the CNN consisting of projecting the three dimensional data
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onto its three aligned orthogonal axes. Let V (x, y, z) be the full three dimensional voxel
data and let V1 (x, y) denote the first projection, which is 41 × 41 in size (1 ≤ x, y ≤ 41).
In general, the ith projection (there is V1 (x, y), V2 (x, z) and V3 (y, z)) is formed through
aggregation across the “missing” dimension. For example, herein V1 (x, y) (all three projections at that) is formed using the maximum operator, i.e., V1 (x, y) = maxz V (x, y, z).
Figure 4.3 is an example of the projection process. Herein, the input to our CNNs is a three
dimensional structure, I(x, y, z), which is 41 × 41 × 3 in size, where I(x, y, 1) = V1 (x, y),
I(x, y, 2) = V2 (x, z) and I(x, y, 3) = V3 (y, z). There are only 5, 043 input neurons, which
is a mere seven percent of our original data.

4.4.3

Shallow CNN

It was not initially clear if I would have sufficient data (volume and variety) to approximate the network hyperparameters for a deep network. Our instinct and size of data set led
us to believe no–or at least I would be likely operating at a potentially dangerous lack of
data level. For example, each fold in our cross validation experiments has just a few runs,
each run has typically tens of targets, and there is a good amount of inner class target and
emplacement variation. On the other hand, I typically have hundreds or thousands of FAs
(non-target examples). Thus, there is a lack of volume and variety of our target class and a
noteworthy class imbalance. As such, I designed a “shallow CNN” that has a single convolutional layer. Our motivation was to not learn parts–like in the case of a deep net–but
to most likely learn a bank of matched filters with respect to our targets. I say most likely
because as will be discussed later, it (matched filters) is one of the many possibilities that
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a CNN can end up learning. Our fears about a single convolutional layer is that it does not
provide a great deal of freedom in terms of affine variation such as scale (e.g., size of target), translation (e.g., poor alignment of alarm localization), occlusion (e.g., line-of-sight
obstruction by foliage), and parts-based detection (e.g., deformation of the target in various
ways). Nevertheless, our goal is to explore this pathway and observe its effectiveness. In
our experiments the number of filters varied. Each filter was set to the size of the input,
i.e., filters were of size 41 × 41 × 3. Furthermore, I experimented with a multiple layer
perceptron (MLP) classifier and a simple linear classifier for sake of complex versus simple solution–again, number of neurons and layers were varied in our experiments. Figure
4.4 is the architecture of our shallow CNN.
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Figure 4.4: Most successful (left) shallow and (right) deep(er) CNNs explored herein.

4.4.4

Deep(er) CNN

Next, I discuss our deep(er) CNN approach (see Figure 4.4). The concept of deep
versus shallow is akin to multi- versus hyper-spectral imaging, i.e., what makes deep/hyper
versus shallow/multi? The reason I explore a deeper network herein is to see if we can learn
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one from limited data and to see if its solution outperforms the shallow net for reasons
discussed in Section 4.4.3; i.e., poor localization, occlusion, etc. Figure 4.4 outlines the
best network I have identified to date. Specifically, the CNN has three convolutional layers
of 7 × 7 size spatial filters (spectral dimension varies). By the time that the pattern gets to
the third convolutional layer the filter more-or-less spans the entire image size. Next, the
remaining 5×5 size image is “flattened” and passed into a MLP for classification, followed
by soft max normalization. Soft max normalization is simply a sigmoidal normalization
step of the outputs so their neural values sum to one. At each step, nonlinear activation
functions are used (ReLU). Last, pooling was used to help us obtain a more robust solution;
it also helps address spatial shifting and addressing scale.
Herein, our architecture was selected in a hybrid human-experiment fashion. Meaning,
I identified a balance between what I expected to work and what experimentally appeared
to be of utility. I did not try to learn the network architecture. As already stated, the problem
of “optimal network” is an outstanding challenge in deep learning (neural networks at that).
The reader can refer to methods like Meta-Learning, e.g., evolving deep networks[49] and
reinforcement learning-based deep network learning[2].

4.4.5

Class Imbalance and Sampling

As already discussed, the nature of our work–experimental platform and reality of
SAEHs–results in a massive amount of effort exerted to design and acquire what turns
out to be a relatively small amount of high quality labeled data for machine learning. This
translates into tens or hundreds of looks at our target class. However, EHs vary in their
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Figure 4.5: Illustration of the resampling ideology used herein. An imbalance factor is
calculated and instances in the true target class are duplicated so there are an even number
of samples in both classes.

properties, i.e., materials, size, rotation, etc., which does not include environment and context (e.g., type and amount of concealment). As such, I am confronted with a target class
that has sparse sampling of instances relative to large inner class variation. On the other
hand, it is simpler to collect a massive amount of not-target data; which are labeled in the
sense of possessing the characteristic of not being a target. This results in a data set with a
large class imbalance, often orders of magnitude larger in non target versus target. In our
experiments I used the data “as is”, meaning I did not address this imbalance. I also experimented with upsampling the true target class. Namely, I calculate the imbalance factor and
duplicate the true targets to be approximately equal in number of samples as the non target
class. At the end of the day, the CNN training cost function is typically driven by a criterion like the sum of squared error across instances and our attempt to balance the number
of samples helps to ensure that the network cannot simply solve 99% of the problem by
focusing on the non-target samples and “ignore” the target instances. By upsampling and
creating a 50%–50% balance between each class, the system needs to focus on both classes
equally to drive the error down. This equal mixture led to much improved convergence and
solution quality in our experiments.
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It is important to note that sampling impacts algorithms in different ways. For example, in support vector machine (SVM) based classification the optimization problem boils
down to typically a relatively small number (depends entirely on the complexity of the
patterns) of data points (the support vectors) that define the margin (decision boundary). In
this respect, beyond the computational and memory burden of more data due to an imbalance, the true impact on the algorithm might not turn out to be much if any. In the case of
soft margins, strategies like weighting the regularization term with respect to the imbalance
factor is often employed in practice. Herein, I am working with neural networks and firstorder gradient-based optimization of stochastic objective functions. Whereas the SVM is,
mathematically, a one step solution to an underlying quadratic optimization problem, current CNN solvers like ADAM are iterative and factors like initialization, data presentation
order and class imbalance can impact the quality of our solution.
Last, I did not take a data augmentation approach herein for a number of reasons. It
is possible that scaling could be of assistance as targets vary in size. Furthermore, I was
curious if translation might help to combat localization issues of the prescreener. However,
I regarded synthetic rotation–which could occur in a number of ways in three dimensions–
to be a potentially dangerous operation. That is, the radar system images objects with true
rotation in different ways due to the physics of the underlying problem and simply rotating
the data would not capture this. I did perform a few preliminary experiments using scale
and translation versus just upsampling the target instances, but no performance benefit
was observed. Due to our initial experiments and our fears about augmentation yielding
convincing radar returns, I avoided augmentation.
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4.4.6

Network Parameter Initialization

Two methods for network parameter initialization are explored. Method one (M1) is
pseudo-random values, i.e., no prior knowledge. The second method (M2) is focused on
a single convolutional layer CNN. In M2, filters are the same size as our input. As such,
the idea was to seed the CNN with examples from our targets and false alarms. In M2, I
run the k-medoid clustering algorithm[53] to partition (versus seek modes in a possibilistic
clustering or related algorithm like mean shift) our true targets. A medoid algorithm was
used because I wanted cluster centers to be exemplars from our data (vs a random location
that may not actually “look” like a target). The same process is repeated on the false alarm
data. One quarter of the first layer filters were assigned true target medoids and the other
three quarters are false alarm mediods. It was our assertion, and experimentally backed,
that using just true target data, or even a 50% blend, is not enough. In order to obtain
satisfactory target versus non-target discrimination, I had to more-or-less recognize known
target signatures and “explain away” non-target data. This was why I ended up using the
(25%,75%) target/false alarm ratio. Furthermore, I take the “time reversed” version of
these filters. The resultant mediods are also pre-processed. They are shifted to have zero
mean and unit variance to remove any potential energy bias. Figure 4.6 illustrates this
process.

4.5

Experiments and Results
In this section, experiments are performed and results are reported in terms of receiver

operating characteristic (ROC) curves on data from an undisclosed U.S. Army test site.
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Figure 4.6: Example of front x-y planes for (left) random weight initialization and (right)
k-medoid clustering.

An NVESD scoring system called Tiger is used. Specifically, Tiger removes bias on behalf
of us evaluating our own alarms. A total of five runs from two lanes are used, each lane
has two different emplacements, and lane-based cross validation is performed. I are in
possession of limited data at the moment because collection on the experimental SAEH
platform is quite an endeavor. Specifically, data collection at this level requires a great
deal of planning, precision, time, and as a result, money. Each lane has to be prepared,
documented, data has to be collected, verified and a ground truth on the data produced
for sake of comparison, to name a few steps. Two individuals scored all of the data in
each lane by manually identifying alarms and assigning a confidence value. The experts
were not given any knowledge about the targets nor environments. Hereafter, I refer to
this human scoring as the human-in-the-loop (HITL). Specifically, the HITL is used as a
baseline to compare our algorithms against.
Our data has multiple types of targets (materials, sizes, etc.) with varying levels of
concealment, emplacement (e.g., rotation), relative to different natural and man made clutter. Specifically, our data set had 91 target instances. When evaluating a strong classifier,
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versus a week one (e.g., prescreener), FARs beyond the reported interval are not shown
and treated as misses because they are not occurring at a realistic level and are likely lucky
detects due to long runs in the ROCs. Figures 4.7 to 4.9 is our ROC-based performance.
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Figure 4.7: ROC curve for run 1. The y-axis is PDR and x-axis is FAR; in false alarms per
meter squared. The two HITL results are shown relative to the shallow and deep CNN.

Figure 4.7 is an example of a relatively easy lane. The HITL achieves a high, e.g.,
greater than 80%, accuracy with little-to-no mistakes. We also see that both the shallow
and deep CNNs are able to more-or-less achieve the same performance. There is a little
back-and-forth with respect to different positive detection rates (PDRs) and FARs, but
overall it would not be a stretch to call them the same ROCs. This informs us that the
CNN, even with limited data, is able to learn a solution on par with a domain expert.
Whereas Figure 4.7 is a simple case, Figure 4.8 is a more challenging run–indicated
by the HITL performance. What is astonishing is that both CNNs beat the humans at a
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Figure 4.8: ROC curve for run 2.
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Figure 4.9: Runs 3, 4 and 5.
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low FAR. More interestingly, the CNNs detect approximately twenty or so more percent
of targets at this low FAR. This is an extremely promising result given the limited data and
extreme difficulty of the human. Furthermore, Figure 4.9 shows runs 3 to 5. In summary,
these results reinforce the fact that a DCNN–and shallow CNN at that–can match, if not
beat the human.
In the above paragraphs we restricted our discussion to the best configuration, i.e., data
projection, network architecture, initialization, etc. I performed many experiments and it
is not feasible, nor truly useful, to report them all in this article. However, I recorded a set
of empirical observations that could be useful to others. At the moment, deep learning is
sadly as much of an art with various (often conflicting) rules of thumbs as it is a science.
The following summarizes our efforts and empirical discoveries.
• (Library) I compared MatConvNet to TensorFlow. This was done for a number of
reasons. First, I wanted to ensure that our results were not biased by underlying
solvers and implementation details related to a particular software package. Second,
I wanted to explore how much variation existed for the same architectures in different
codes. Ultimately, I went with TensorFlow due to the quality of the results it found,
support of ADAM optimization, online documentation, support and flexibility to
extend, etc. What I discovered was unexpected, but logical and interesting. First,
for the same architecture TensorFlow converged quicker and found better solutions
(both with respect to PD and FAR reduction). Second, our MatConvNet results
had the shallow CNN outperforming the DCNN. However, this was the opposite
in TensorFlow. The point being, our observation is that a positive experiment is
good news, but a negative outcome is no news. If one changes the initialization,
optimizer, etc. a failed solution can turn into a positive outcome. The point being,
CNNs have many moving parts and until we are able to more intelligently discover
the architecture and find more robust solvers the act of learning a CNN is as more
an art than science. This paper is sadly not proof of the best way to use CNNs for
SAEH detection. Instead, its evidence that good CNN solutions can be found and
perform as well as, if not better than a human.
• (Filter Initialization) I experimented with both intelligent initialization and random
weight initialization for filters. The ROCs reported are for random initialization,
which was the top performer. Overall, I found that intelligent initialization led to
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ROCs that more-or-less matched the HITL. Furthermore, in the case of a shallow
(one convolutional layer) CNN the optimized filters “looked” like what I would expect. Meaning, one can visually make out target signatures that look like our data.
This is sort of reinforcing in an explainable AI (XAI) regard. On the other hand,
random initialization led to better overall results, both with respect to PDR and FAR.
But, upon manual inspection the learned filters appeared random–no discernible
structure could be identified. I found this interesting, because mathematically our
CNNs are capable of encoding a linear combination of random projections. However, these solutions evade description–they are a black box. I also tried to freeze the
initial random weights and only the classifier was trained. Our experiments showed
improved results, indicating that if there is an underlying ensemble of random projections the system seems to like to evolve the projection matrices and final linear
combination. Ultimately, at the end of the day if I obtained a human pleasing explanation or a black box, the reality is they both are just decision boundaries in a pattern
recognition problem being addressed using neural networks.
• (Batch Normalization (BN)) Whereas BN is often a key factor in discovering quality solutions, our BN and no BN solutions yielded more-or-less the same results
herein for TensorFlow. This was not the case in MatConvNet–it preferred BN. Since
similar results were found with and without BN in TensorFlow, I invoked Occam’s
Razor and went with the simplest solution. One possible explanation is that BN is
not possibly relevant with respect to a single shallow CNN and perhaps our still shallow DCNN. Meaning, it was not really able to fully exploit the advantages of BN in
terms of addressing factors like the internal covariate shift and diminishing gradients
challenges.
• (Linear versus MLP) Herein, I explored a variety of network architectures with
respect to both feature and classification layers. Our experiments show that simple
linear versus MLP classification layers work best. However, I suspect that this might
be due in part to our limited data (volume and variety).
• (Full VSR Data versus Projected Data) ROC results-wise, I did not observe any
advantage in using the full VSR data versus the projected plane data. However, both
training and testing (evaluation) took less time. I am skeptical about declaring that
projected data is an overall better route. One cannot prove by example. Additional
experiments need to be performed with different targets, emplacements, occluders,
etc. to determine if projected data lessens system performance in what is hard cases.
• (Pre-Processing) I tried a few pre-processing operations on the raw VSR data.
Specifically, I explored; clipping energy returns below some minimal value, I scaled
each chunk to a fixed range (e.g., [0,1]), and I scaled chunk to a global range per
fold (with respect to both minimum to maximum value and zero mean with unit
deviation). Overall, results were similar if not noticeably worse when I performed
pre-processing. As such, I directly fed the VSR data into the CNNs.
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• (Sampling) I experimented with no sampling, i.e., use all the data as is, and the
discussed upsampling of the true target class. In our experiments upsampling had an
impact, both in terms of number of iterations required to converge and the overall
quality of the final solution.

4.6

Conclusion
Herein, I investigated the detection of SAEHs via deep learning using different open

source CNN libraries (MatConvNet and TensorFlow). Specifically, I explored a data projection method, various shallow and deep(er) neural architectures, filter initialization, and
VSR data pre-processing operations. I was able to achieve the same, if not better, results
than the HITL in light of limited data and a class imbalance. Our preliminary results are
encouraging but more research is needed; theoretically and empirically.
In future work, I plan to explore the use of generative adversarial networks (GANs) for
imputing new data to train with on an inherently low volume and gross class imbalance domain. Furthermore, I was not pleased with the neural ingredients (mathematical functions
used in layers) and solvers (e.g., ADAM versus Meta Learning). I will also investigate
the application of different mathematics and algorithms for fusing features and network
architectures (decisions). At a higher level, another goal is to discover how to incorporate
and exploit other sensors like lidar and synthetic aperture acoustics. Last, our current work
is a machine learning driven work. Our final future idea is to discover more “physics inspired” processing and neural architectures to improve results and obtain results that can
be understand and ultimately trust (beyond ROC analysis).
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

5.1

Contribution
The target for this research was the design of algorithms for detecting explosive hazard

devices. Using data provided by the U.S. Army RDECOM CERDEC NVESD I was able
to produce promising multi-stage algorithms for the detection of explosives in 3d voxel
space radar. The first difficulty was the size of the data sets. A single frame of data held a
massive number of voxels, and these needed to be processed in as close to real-time as possible. The answer to this problem was to create a prescreener to filter out the empty space
which comprised a large portion of each frame. This was done using a combination of a
matched filter and a size-contrast filter to find areas that were both anomalous and had an
energy signature similar to the known signature of the explosive hazards. This significantly
reduced the number of data points within each frame that needed to be evaluated by the
more complex stages of the algorithm. From this stage there were two different approaches
used for detection. The first method was to apply mean-shift clustering to the output of the
prescreener to separate it into distinct objects, then use a tailored threshold value to either
accept or reject clusters as a target. This method produced very encouraging results, getting upwards of 80% positive detection with very few false alarms. The issue with this
method was the means by which the algorithm accepted or rejected a potential detection.
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It was simple and prone to easy manipulation. To resolve this problem the thresholding
stage was replaced by a convolutional neural network designed to accept areas of interest
and classify them as either target or non-target. The clustering would separate the data into
distinct objects of interest. To prevent the training and evaluation of the CNN from being a
significant computational bottleneck, the areas of interest were transformed into a 3-layer
stack of its principal axis projections. These stacked projections were fed to the CNN, and
a 0-1 likelihood that it was a target was produced. Another obstacle presented itself when
training the CNN, as there was not enough annotated samples for robust learning. This
problem was solved by taking the available data and applying a series of translations and
augmentations to artificially create a large training data set. The results of the CNN based
algorithm were consistently as good or better than an experienced human could achieve.
This showed that the use of deep learning techniques was a viable option for the detection
algorithm, and was very encouraging.

5.2

Future work
In this research I explored several methods for detecting side-attack explosive hazards.

The filters and fusion techniques used in the prescreener are fairly simple. I would like to
explore more advanced methods of evaluation, particularly in three dimensions as I believe
some information is lost in the process of projecting the data into 2D images. I would also
like to explore more sophisticated filter options for a 3D matched filter in the prescreener.
This could reduce the problems with edge cases such as walls and metal signs. I would
also like to explore the use of different neural networks, such as a generative adversarial
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networks (GAN), which show promise in the presence of small training sample sizes and
class imbalance. Finally, I would like to explore the incorporation of additional sensors.
This could allow for cross-referencing to eliminate false alarms due to aliasing or nontargets with anomalous radar signatures.
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